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Abstract—The appearance of the flexible behavior of end-
users based on demand response programs makes the power
distribution grids more active. Thus, electricity market partic-
ipants in the bottom layer of the power system, wish to be
involved in the decision-making process related to local energy
management problems, increasing the efficiency of the energy
trade in distribution networks. This paper proposes monopolistic
and game-based approaches for the management of energy
flexibility through end-users, aggregators, and the Distribution
System Operator (DSO) which are defined as agents in the
power distribution system. Besides, a 33-bus distribution network
is considered to evaluate the performance of our proposed
approaches for energy flexibility management model based on
impact of flexibility behaviors of end-users and aggregators in
the distribution network. According to the simulation results, it
is concluded that although the monopolistic approach could be
profitable for all agents in the distribution network, the game-
based approach is not profitable for end-users.
Index Terms—Decentralized energy management, energy flex-
ibility, game-based energy management, local energy trading.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices
t Time periods [h].
j End-users.
k Aggregators.
i Iterations.
B. Variables
OF agk Objective function of aggregator k [e].
OF dso Objective function of the DSO [e].
OF euj Objective function of end-user j [e].
Ljt Real-time load at time t of end-user j [kWh].
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Lfjt Energy flexibility at time t for an end-user j
[kWh].
PL2Ajkt Energy traded at time t between an end-user j
and an aggregator k [kWh].
P rtt Real-time energy exchanged at time t between
the DSO and the Real-Time Electricity Market
(RTEM) [kWh].
PA2DSOkt Energy traded at time t between aggregator k
and the DSO [kWh].
PDSO2Ljt Energy purchased at time t by end-user j from
the DSO [kWh].
PPkt An auxiliary variable representing the cost of
energy traded at time t with the DSO for
aggregator k [e].
PP dnkt An auxiliary variable representing the profit
obtained from the energy sold at time t to the
DSO for aggregator k [e].
PPupkt An auxiliary variable representing the cost of
the energy purchased at time t from the DSO
for aggregator k [e].
zkt A binary variable which is determined by the
DSO to represent states of electricity price at
time t of aggregator k.
λA2DSOkt Electricity price at time t for the aggregator k
and the DSO exchanges [e/kWh].
C. Parameters
Lcjt Scheduled load at time t for end-user j [kWh].
M Large number.
 Small number as the stopping criteria for the
iterative loop.
λDSO2L Price for energy exchanged between the DSO
and end-users [e/kWh].
λL2Akt Price for electricity exchanged at time t be-
tween the aggregator k and the aggregated end-
users [e/kWh].
λrtt Price for electricity exchanged at time t be-
tween the DSO and the RTEM [e/kWh].
δkt Profit guarantee factor at time t for aggregator
k (δkt > 1).
γj Flexibility factor for end-user j (0 ≤ γj ≤ 1).
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER distribution systems are more active than theirconventional structures due to Demand Response (DR)
strategies and increment of distributed energy resources power
2generation. Thus, centralized electricity markets cannot follow
the flexible behavior of end-users in the bottom layer of the
distribution systems [1]. Therefore, new decentralized market
structures are required to provide energy flexibility. There are
different works in this area which presented energy manage-
ment mechanisms for energy transaction in power distribution
networks.
Several works presented models for the local electricity
markets, transactive energy and multi agent-based energy man-
agement systems in distribution network. For instance, Ref. [2]
presented the transactive energy nodes that connect buildings
and the Local Electricity Market (LEM). In this way, the
energy management problems of both buildings and the local
market are optimized simultaneously. In [3], a price-based
method has been proposed for energy management. Authors in
[3] presented a distributed approach to decompose the central
energy management system into several local and indepen-
dent systems. In [4], authors designed a multi agent-based
transactive energy market for decentralize decision-making.
In [4], the Distribution System Operator (DSO) is responsible
for determining locational marginal price, the balance between
generation and consumption, and guarantees the resiliency and
reliability in the distribution network. In [5], a multi-layer
market environment based on Multi Agent Systems (MASs) is
presented to model the behavior of electricity market players.
By using an incomplete information game theoretic model,
each customer selects its supplying agent, so the agents must
compete with each other to keep their customers. In [6],
authors presented a real-time price-based method to control
the frequency. In this way, agents and the aggregator solve
their own energy management problems locally and send their
optimum decisions to the central price controller. Then, the
central controller modifies the price and sends it back to local
agents.
In addition, a part of the literature addresses the interaction
between multi-suppliers and multi-consumers through DR
strategies or demand regulation. In [7], the DR strategy is
performed in systems with several suppliers and a number of
domestic consumers. In [8], a distributed real-time framework
has been presented by multi-suppliers to regulate customer de-
mand. On this basis, a dual decomposition technique has been
employed for energy allocation. In [9], a distributed model has
been introduced to find optimal power flow in radial networks
considering the regulation of demand. In [10], demand control
strategies have been modeled by the Stackelberg game between
suppliers and consumers. In [11], a framework has been
presented to find the optimal consumers demand and their
bill payments by using an adaptive consumption level pricing.
In [12], the centralized energy trading has been formulated
as a bi-level model, and the nonconvexity of the problem is
covered by convex relaxation techniques. Then, the privacy
issue has been addressed by employing a decentralized energy
trading framework. In [13], a decentralized DR framework has
been presented which considers the operational constraints of
the system into account. To this end, the individual entities
respond to the control signals in order to update their de-
mand/generation profiles.
In addition, energy trading models based on game theory
are another line of research that has been presented in sev-
eral works. Ref. [14] presented a distributed mechanism to
exchange energy between Micro-Grids (MGs) in a competitive
market. Moreover, a hierarchical decision-making mechanism
is proposed in the Stackelberg game. In [15], a LEM has been
proposed in which market agents transact electricity with each
other independently. Therefore, consumers can purchase their
demand from producers directly at the market-clearing price
that is set by the local market operator. Also, each agent only
shares its energy price and quantity with the market in each
decision-making time period. In [16], an adaptive learning
algorithm has been presented to find the Nash equilibrium with
incomplete information. In the presented game, players use a
learning automation structure to provide their action probabil-
ity distributions according to their private information. Ref.
[17] designed a contribution-based trading mechanism among
MGs. The MGs are either providers or consumers depending
on the status of their electricity production and the local
demand. The authors went one step further and presented an
event-driven electricity trading system among MGs in which
the trading happens when one consumer demands electricity
[18]. In the game theoretic model, a consumer-side reward
concept has been also presented to motivate the trading system.
In [19], a multi-agent transactive system has been presented
where an energy management system prompted by MGs in
a distribution system to solve the complexity of aggregation.
Hierarchical structure is one of the proposed approaches for
local energy trade in the distribution network. In [20], a hierar-
chical framework has been presented for the real-time trading
in the power distribution grids. Thus, aggregators transact with
electrical consumers and the distribution company. Authors in
[21] couple the energy management problem with and Ising-
based model to study the interaction through them in the power
distribution system. In this way, the energy flexibility of the
consumers has been modeled through the Ising spin-based
model.
Although various models have been presented in the litera-
ture to study the behavior of market participants in the bottom
layer of the power system, an interplay model for energy
flexibility management through end-users, aggregators and
DSO has not been addressed. In distributed and decentralized
energy trading approaches, players in the distribution network
manage energy to gain maximum profit for themselves without
considering the profits of the DSO as an agent who acts
as a policy-maker in the distribution network. However, the
interplay model presents a manner that players (in different
layers of the distribution network) can not also make optimal
decisions independently, but are also able to exchange their
desired decisions to the DSO. Energy flexibility is defined as
the ability to change the behaviour of power system players
related to their energy production or demand due to reaction
to price or other incentive signals [22].
In this paper, end-users are defined as agents who are in
charge of providing energy flexibility in the system. Thus,
they are able to modify their demand pattern in the real-
time energy transaction. In other words, energy flexibility
has been defined as a service that end-users are able to
provide due to their flexible behaviour on their scheduled
3electrical demand. Thus, flexibility has not been modelled as
a contracted capacity. In this paper, we present monopolistic
and game-based approaches for energy flexibility management
in the power distribution system. In this way, a hierarchical
structure is proposed to transact energy among the real-time
electricity market and distribution network’s agents (end-users,
aggregators, and the DSO). Moreover, flexible behaviors of
end-users and aggregators are modeled to provide shiftable and
sustainable demands in power distribution grid. According to
our proposed monopolistic approach, all end-users and aggre-
gators are able to manage their energy flexibility independently
through a bottom-up approach. However, our proposed game-
based approach is defined to overcome the challenge posed by
decisions made by agents in the distribution network. In other
words, we model the interactions between agents (the DSO
and aggregators, or the DSO and end-users) as an iterative
algorithm in the game-based approach. Thus, the contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Regarding the formulation of the proposed energy flexi-
bility management, a Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) model is proposed to resolve the non-linearity of
cost/profit for the energy transacted between players in
the problem.
• Regarding energy-trading strategies, monopolistic and
game-based approaches are proposed for energy flexibil-
ity management through end-users, aggregators and the
DSO in the distribution network.
• Regarding analysing the system, different types of flex-
ibility are defined and assessed in the proposed energy
management problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the problem formulation is described. Section III introduces
our approaches to manage energy flexibility in the distribution
network. Then, the simulation results of the 33-bus test system
are illustrated in Section IV. Finally, our findings are discussed
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we propose a real-time energy management
problem for transacting energy flexibility among three types
of agents in the power distribution systems, e.g., end-users,
aggregators, and the DSO. In this structure, the RTEM can
only exchange real-time energy flexibility with the DSO, PRTt ,
as shown in Fig.1.
According to our proposed approach, consumers exchange
energy flexibility with the corresponding aggregator (who
bought their scheduled energy), PL2Ajt , and the DSO, P
DSO2L
jt ,
at prices λL2Akt and λ
DSO2L, respectively. Here, we consider
λDSO2L as given amount. Then, the aggregator transacts en-
ergy flexibility, PA2DSOkt , with the DSO. Despite the real-time
flexibility transactions between consumers and aggregators,
and aggregators and the DSO are two-way, consumers can
only buy real-time energy from the DSO. Next, corresponding
equations of each agent are described. Each end-user can
decrease or increase its scheduled load in the real-time to
provide either upward or downward flexible load, respec-
tively, as represented in (1). Eq. (2) represents minimum and
Fig. 1: Agents and real-time energy transaction framework of
the distribution network [20], [21].
maximum limitations of the energy flexibility. Here, γj is
defined as a flexibility factor which can be set between 0
and 1. The flexible energy splits itself into real-time energy
exchanged with corresponding aggregator (PL2Ajt ) and the
DSO (PDSO2Ljt ) as represented in (3). Moreover, Eq. (4) states
that the real-time energy transaction between the end-users
and the DSO is one-way (from the DSO to end-users). In this
paper, end-users are considered to be shiftable loads to provide
energy flexibility as represented by (6). Besides, each end-user
can be limited over all end-users that are aggregated by the
same aggregator in each time step as seen in (5).
Ljt = L
c
jt − Lfjt, ∀j, t (1)
−γjLcjt ≤ Lfjt ≤ γjLcjt ,∀j, t (2)
Lfjt = P
L2A
jt − PDSO2Ljt , ∀j, t (3)
PDSO2Ljt ≥ 0,∀j, t (4)∑
j∈Ak
Lfjt = 0 ,∀t (5)∑
t
Lfjt = 0 ,∀j (6)
According to our hierarchical structure, the total transacted
energy flexibility through end-users and aggregators should be
exchanged through aggregators and the DSO as represented in
(7). Moreover, Eqs. (8) and (9) are defined in the aggregators’
layer to provide self-consumption and shiftable traded real-
time energy between aggregators and end-users as well as (5)
and (6) which have been represented in the bottom layer of
the system.
PA2DSOkt =
∑
j∈Ak
PL2Ajt ,∀k, t (7)∑
j∈Ak
PL2Ajt = 0 ,∀t (8)∑
t
PL2Ajt = 0 ,∀j (9)
The maximum and minimum constraints of the price of
energy traded between aggregators and the DSO, λA2DSOkt ,
are represented in (10). Besides, the balancing equation in the
4layer of the DSO to trade real-time energy flexibility through
the DSO and the RTEM, and the rest of the agents presented
in (11).
δktλ
L2A
kt ≤ λA2DSOkt ≤ λrtt ,∀t, k (10)
P rtt =
∑
j
PDSO2Ljt −
∑
k
PA2DSOkt ,∀t (11)
In this way, the objective functions of end-users, aggrega-
tors, and the DSO are represented in (12), (13), and (14),
respectively. In (12), the objective function of each end-user is
expressed which should be minimized. The objective function
of end-user j consists of two terms. First term represents
the objective function due to buy real-time energy from
the DSO, and the second term states the profit due to sell
energy flexibility to the aggregator. As represented in (13),
the objective function consists of two terms which consists
of the cost due to trading energy flexibility with the end-
users, and the profit due to energy transaction with the DSO,
(however, λA2DSOkt P
A2DSO
kt makes the problem non-linear). In
(14), OF dso includes three terms consisting of the objective
function of energy transaction with aggregators, the cost of
exchanged energy with the RTEM, and the profit due to sell
energy to end-users.
OF euj∈Ak = λ
DSO2L
∑
t
PDSO2Ljt −
∑
t
λL2Akt P
L2A
jt (12)
OF agk =
∑
t
∑
j∈Ak
λL2Akt P
L2A
jt (13)
−
∑
t
λA2DSOkt P
A2DSO
kt ∀k
OF dso =
∑
t
λA2DSOkt P
A2DSO
kt +
∑
t
λrtt P
rt
t (14)
− λDSO2L
∑
t
∑
j
PDSO2Ljt
III. ENERGY FLEXIBILITY MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
In this section, we define two approaches, monopolistic
and game-based, to manage energy flexibility in the power
distribution system. In the monopolistic approach, all end-
users and aggregators are able to manage their energy flexi-
bility autonomously. However, we define interactions between
the DSO and aggregators, or the DSO and end-users in the
game-based approach for the energy flexibility management
problem. In addition, an MILP model of our proposed energy
flexibility management problem is presented in the following.
A. MILP model
As mentioned in Section II, λA2DSOkt P
A2DSO
kt makes the
objective functions of the aggregators and the DSO as repre-
sented in (13), and (14). In this paper, we propose a model
in which the DSO is in charge of determining the price of
energy traded between the aggregators and the DSO, λA2DSOkt ,
with the aim of minimizing its objective function, OF dso.
Also, λA2DSOkt is limited to maximum and minimum bands
according to (10). In this way, if energy exchanged between
aggregators and the DSO is positive, PA2DSOkt ≥ 0, then
the DSO sets the minimum price limitations bands. However,
the DSO determines the maximum band of price’s limitation
where energy traded between aggregators and the DSO is
negative, PA2DSOkt < 0. Hence, we have:
IF PA2DSOkt ≥ 0 →
λA2DSOkt =Min.{δktλL2Akt , λrtt }→ zkt = 0.
ELSE PA2DSOkt < 0 →
λA2DSOkt =Max.{δktλL2Akt , λrtt }→ zkt = 1.
Here, zkt is defined as a binary variable which is determined
by the DSO to represent states of electricity price which are
set by the DSO. Thus, the nonlinear term is restated as seen
in (15).
λA2DSOkt P
A2DSO
kt = {δktλL2Akt (1− zkt) (15)
+ λrtt zkt}PA2DSOkt = PPkt∀t, k
PPkt = PP
dn
kt + PP
up
kt ∀t, k (16)
PP dnkt = δktλ
L2A
kt (1− zkt)PA2DSOkt ∀t, k (17)
PPupkt = λ
rt
t zktP
A2DSO
kt ∀t, k (18)
As represented in (16), PPkt is split into PP dnkt and PP
up
kt .
In this way, each of these nonlinear constraints, (17) and (18),
can be redefined as mixed integer linear constraints according
to Ref. [23]. Hence, Eq. (15) is redefined as presented in (19)-
(23).
− zktM ≤ PP dnkt − δktλL2Akt PA2DSOkt ≤ zktM∀t, k (19)
− γjδktλL2Akt (1− zkt)
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt ≤ PP dnkt (20)
≤ γjδktλL2Akt (1− zkt)
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt∀t, k
− (1− zkt)M ≤ PPupkt − λrtt PA2DSOkt (21)
≤ (1− zkt)M∀t, k
− γjλrtt zkt
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt ≤ PPupkt (22)
≤ γjλrtt zkt
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt∀t, k
− γjzkt
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt ≤ PPA2DSOkt (23)
≤ γj(1− zkt)
∑
j∈Ak
Lcjt∀t, k
Thus, Eqs. (19) and (20) represent (17). On the other hand,
Eqs. (21) and (22) express (18). Moreover, the relationship
between the energy transacted through aggregators and the
DSO, PPA2DSOkt , and its corresponding electricity price,
λA2DSOkt , is represented in (23). According to (23), zkt equals
0 when PPA2DSOkt is positive. On the other hand, zkt as binary
variable is equal to 1 when PPA2DSOkt is negative. Therefore,
the objective functions of aggregators and the DSO should be
redefined as they are represented in (24) and (25), respectively.
Hence, the respective energy management problems should be
presented considering (16), and (19)-(23).
5OF ag
′
k =
∑
t
∑
j∈Ak
λL2Akt P
L2A
jt −
∑
t
PPkt∀k (24)
OF dso
′
=
∑
t
PPkt +
∑
t
λrtt P
rt
t (25)
− λDSO2L
∑
t
∑
j
PDSO2Ljt
B. Monopolistic Approach
1) Aggregators-based: Here, the decentralized energy man-
agement problem is modeled from the aggregators’ perspective
as seen in the following (Problem M1):
Min. OF ag
′
=
∑
k OF
ag′
k
s.t. (1)-(9), (11) and (16), and (19)-(23).
Each aggregator transacts energy flexibility with the con-
sumers which are in its region, and the DSO. However, aggre-
gators are not able to exchange energy with other aggregators
and their corresponding end-users. Moreover, all four types of
flexibility definition can be considered in this approach.
2) Consumers-based: In this section, a decentralized en-
ergy flexibility management problem is modeled by con-
sumers. Thus, end-users manage their energy flexibility au-
tonomously. Also, consumers can only provide shiftable loads
and energy transaction with the aggregator, Eq. (6) and (9),
respectively. Hence, Eqs. (5) and (8) are not provided in this
approach as it needs coalition of the consumers in the aggre-
gators’ layer. Each end-user transacts energy flexibility with
its corresponding aggregator. Besides, end-users are able to
buy real-time energy from the DSO. Therefore, the consumer-
based decentralized energy flexibility management problem is
modeled in the following (Problem M2):
Min. OF eu =
∑
j OF
eu
j
s.t. (1)-(4), (6)-(7), (9), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
Hence, this problem can be decomposed to j independent
problems in which each end-user manages its own energy
flexibility without coalition with other end-users. In this way,
end-users are able to provide only shiftable loads, because Eqs.
(5) and (8) are not considered in this approach which requires
end-users to cooperate with each other in order to improve the
sustainability of the power distribution grid.
C. Game-based Approach
1) Interaction between Aggregators and the DSO: In this
section, the transaction of energy flexibility is modeled in
terms of interaction between the aggregators and the DSO.
In our proposed game-based algorithm, aggregators are in
charge of determining the quantity of energy flexibility traded
between the aggregators and the DSO, PA2DSOkt . However,
the DSO determines the electricity price of energy transaction
between the aggregators and the DSO, λA2DSOkt . Thus, the
DSO sets zkt to represent states of electricity price in the
MILP model of the energy management problem. Algorithm
1 represents our proposed game-based algorithm for energy
flexibility trade through the aggregators and the DSO as seen
in Fig. 2(a). According to Algorithm 1, each aggregator k
and the DSO make decisions regarding their own autonomous
(a) Algorithm 1.
(b) Algorithm 2.
Fig. 2: Game-based interaction to transact energy between
aggregators and the DSO (a), end-users and the DSO (b).
energy management problem considering interaction signals
among aggregators and the DSO. Below, the energy manage-
ment problems of aggregators and the DSO are presented:
• Aggregators’ problem (Problem A):
Min. OF ag
′
=
∑
k OF
ag′
k
s.t. (1)-(3), (5)-(9), (16), (19)-(23).
• DSO’s problem (Problem D):
Min. OF dso
′
s.t. (4), (11), (16), (19)-(23).
In this structure, the energy flexibility in the bottom-layer
of the system is managed only by aggregators. This model
has an advantage to manage directly quantity of energy traded
between the aggregators and the DSO, PA2DSOkt . However,
the weakness of this approach is to not see the profits and
costs of end-users in decision-making where end-users are
the main agents to provide energy flexibility to the system.
Moreover, convergence is a challenge in the proposed iterative
algorithm. Thus, Eq. (26) is defined as a convergence condition
6for Algorithm 1 to trade real-time energy between aggregators
and the DSO.
|OF dso′i −OF dso
′
i−1 |+ |OF ag
′
i −OF ag
′
i−1| <  (26)
2) Interaction between End-users and the DSO: In this
approach, end-users and the DSO are the agents who manage
energy flexibility, and aggregators are considered to be non-
profitable players in the power distribution network. Here, the
energy management problem of the DSO is identical to respec-
tive one in game-based interaction between the aggregators
and the DSO (Problem D). Thus, the energy management
problem of end-users is:
• End-users’ problem (Problem E):
Min. OF eu
s.t. (1)-(4), (6)-(7), (9), (16), and (19)-(23).
In this way, the convergence condition for Algorithm 2 is
defined according to (27).
|OF dso′i −OF dso
′
i−1 |+ |OF eu
′
i −OF eu
′
i−1| <  (27)
In Problem E, end-users manage their own energy flexibil-
ity independently and control the energy traded through the
aggregators and the DSO. On the other hand, the DSO sets
the electricity price for the transaction of energy between the
aggregators and the DSO based on Algorithm 2 which has
been presented in Fig. 2(b).
IV. MATHEMATICAL DISCUSSION
This section analyses monopolistic and game-based ap-
proaches to trade energy flexibility in the distribution network.
In this way, for the consumers-based (Problem M2), three
scenarios are defined to study the impact of flexibility con-
straints on the energy management problem. Additionally, for
the aggregators-based (Problem M1), the impact of energy
flexibility is assessed in five scenarios. These scenarios are
presented in Table I. In C1 and A1, end-users play as
interruptible loads that provide energy flexibility. End-users
provide shiftable load in scenarios C2 and A2. In C3 and
A4, the shiftable energy flexibility service is provided by end-
users. The community of end-users acts as a self-consumption
and sustainable energy system in scenario A3. However,
scenario A5 represents the impact of self-consumption energy
flexibility service provided by a community of end-users to
the sustainable distribution network.
A. Monopolistic Approach
1) Aggregators-based: In the monopolistic approach from
the perspective of aggregators, OF ag
′
k (= OF
ag
k ) should be
minimized by aggregators. According to (7), PA2DSOkt equals∑
j∈Ak P
L2A
jt . In this way, OF
ag
k is represented in (28).
Moreover, according to (10), λA2DSOkt is greater than λ
L2A
kt
if δkt > 1. In other words, if δkt > 1, we have:
OF agk =
∑
t
∑
j∈Ak
(λL2Akt − λA2DSOkt )PL2Ajt ,∀k (28)
λL2Akt − λA2DSOkt < 0,∀t, k (29)
TABLE I: Energy flexibility’s scenarios.
Scenario Min. s.t.
C1 OF eu (1)-(4), (7), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
C2 OF eu (1)-(4), (6)-(7), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
C3 OF eu (1)-(4), (7), (9), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
A1 OFag
′
(1)-(4), (7), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
A2 OFag
′
(1)-(4), (6)-(7), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
A3 OFag
′
(1)-(5), (7), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
A4 OFag
′
(1)-(4), (7), (9), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
A5 OFag
′
(1)-(4), (7)-(8), (11), (16), and (19)-(23).
According to (28) and (29), aggregators are willing to
maximize PL2Ajt . Thus, we obtain P
L2A
jt > 0 as it is shown
in Fig. 3 (a). However, Eqs. (5) and (6) constrain Lfjt. Hence,
PL2Ajt is positive in A1-A3 considering these constraints and
push end-users to buy energy from the DSO. However, PL2Ajt
should be positive and negative in different time intervals
based on (8) and (9) in A4 and A5.
2) Consumers-based: End-users minimize their corre-
sponding objective function, OF euj∈Ak . As it is seen in (12),
OF euj∈Ak consists of two terms. End-users minimize the first
term (λDSO2L
∑
t P
DSO2L
jt ) and maximize the second term
(
∑
t λ
L2A
kt P
L2A
jt ). According to (4), P
DSO2L
jt is greater than
and equal to zero. Hence, PDSO2Ljt must be equal to zero in
order to minimize the first term of OF euj∈Ak . In this way, end-
users only transact energy flexibility with the aggregators in
the monopolistic approach from the perspective of end-users
as seen in Fig. 3 (b).
B. Game-based Approach
1) Interaction between aggregators and the DSO: As high-
lighted before, aggregators determine the energy transacted
between the DSO and aggregators in this approach. However,
the DSO is in charge of setting the price of the energy
traded between the DSO and the aggregators. Moreover, the
DSO determines the energy sold to the end-users, PDSO2Ljt .
The DSO minimizes its objective function. As seen in (14)
and (25), OF dso(= OF dso
′
) contains three terms. The DSO
minimizes first and second terms, and it maximizes the third
one (
∑
t
∑
j λ
DSO2LPDSO2Ljt ). Thus, P
DSO2L
jt is positive in
all cases in the game-based approach as it is illustrated in Fig.
4. According to (3), as PDSO2Ljt is positive in the game-based
approach, PL2Ajt is greater than L
f
jt as represented in (30). In
this way, if Eq. (6) is considered (
∑
t L
f
jt = 0), it is given
that:
PL2Ajt > L
f
jt,∀t, j (30)∑
t
PL2Ajt > 0,∀j (31)∑
j∈Ak
PL2Ajt > 0,∀j (32)
As seen in (31), constraint (9) is not feasible in this case.
In other worlds, it is not feasible to consider constraints
(6) and (9) simultaneously in the game-based approach from
the perspective of the aggregators. Moreover, if Eq. (5) is
7(a) Monopolistic approach from the perspective of aggregators.
(b) Monopolistic approach from the perspective of end-users.
Fig. 3: Real-time traded energy flows through agents in the
monopolistic approach.
considered (
∑
j∈Ak L
f
jt = 0), Eq. (32) is obtained. Thus,
according to (7) and (32), we have PA2DSOkt > 0. In this
way, λA2DSOkt equals δktλ
L2A
kt , if δktλ
L2A
kt is less than λ
rt
t .
2) Interaction between End-users and the DSO: In this
approach, PDSO2Ljt is determined by the DSO. On the one
hand, end-users do not have any direct control on PDSO2Ljt .
For this reason, end-users buy the real-time energy from the
DSO in the game-based approach. On the other hand, the
DSO minimizes its objective function in this approach. Here,
we replace PDSO2Ljt with L
f
jt and P
L2A
jt according to (3).
Therefore, OF euj∈Ak is represented in (33). In this way, if
constraint (6) is considered (
∑
t L
f
jt = 0), Eq. (34) is obtained:
OF euj∈Ak = λ
DSO2L
∑
t
(PL2Ajt − Lfjt)
−
∑
t
λL2Akt P
L2A
jt ,∀j
=
∑
t
[(λDSO2L − λL2Akt )PL2Ajt − λDSO2LLfjt],∀j (33)
OF euj∈Ak =
∑
t
[(λDSO2L − λL2Akt )PL2Ajt ,∀j (34)
(a) Game-based interaction between aggregators and the DSO.
(b) Game-based interaction between end-users and the DSO.
Fig. 4: Real-time traded energy flows through agents in the
game-based approach.
Thus, end-users minimize PL2Ajt , if λ
DSO2L > λL2Akt .
Furthermore,
∑
t P
L2A
jt is greater than zero, and P
L2A
jt could
be positive or negative in different time intervals as it is shown
in Fig. 4 (b). If constraint (9) is considered, Eq. (35) is given.
Thus,
∑
t L
f
jt is negative because the energy traded between
the end-users and the DSO is positive in the game-based
approach.
∑
t
Lfjt = −
∑
t
PDSO2Ljt ,∀j (35)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Case Study
In this paper, a 33-bus test system is used from [20], [21],
[24] to assess our proposed approaches to manage energy flex-
ibility as shown in Fig.5. Three regions have been considered
which are managed by their corresponding aggregators. The
energy price which is traded in each of this region is different
as shown in Table II. Also, we assume that λDSO2L = 0.6
[e/kWh], γj = 0.1, and δkt = 1.1 according to Refs. [20] and
[21]. Our proposed energy management models are studied
in both, monopolistic and game-based approaches. Also, our
proposed MILP models are solved in Generalised Algebraic
Modelling system (GAMS) [25].
8Fig. 5: 33-bus test system and aggregators [20], [21], [24].
TABLE II: Prices of traded energy between consumers and
aggregators [20], [21].
Time λL2Ak=1,t λ
L2A
k=2,t λ
L2A
k=3,t λ
RT
t
(h) [e/kWh] [e/kWh] [e/kWh] [e/kWh]
1 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.13
2 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.12
3 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.15
4 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.11
5 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.30
6 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.32
7 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.35
8 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.40
9 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.42
10 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.66
11 0.26 0.42 0.36 0.71
12 0.28 0.43 0.37 0.74
13 0.25 0.40 0.32 0.69
14 0.18 0.26 0.21 0.50
15 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.41
16 0.14 0.22 0.18 0.40
17 0.15 0.25 0.19 0.42
18 0.20 0.36 0.30 0.60
19 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.65
20 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.67
21 0.24 0.42 0.33 0.70
22 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.35
23 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.28
24 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.15
B. Evaluation of Monopolistic Approach
In this section, the energy flexibility management problem
in the power distribution system is studied according to the
monopolistic approach. As it has been explained in Section
III. B, the proposed energy management problem is modeled
on the basis of only one group of agents- e.g. consumers or
aggregators.
Table III shows the impact of energy flexibility on total
objective functions of end-users, aggregators, and the DSO in
the monopolistic approach. As presented in Table III, OF eu,
OF ag
′
, and OF dso
′
are negative in C1. In other words,
energy flexibility transaction is profitable for all end-users,
aggregators and the DSO. It is because of the bottom-up
TABLE III: Total costs of end-users, aggregators, and the DSO
in the monopolistic approach.
C1 C2 C3
OF eu [e] -2394.438 -714.291 -714.291
OFag
′
[e] -239.444 733.548 749.681
OF dso
′
[e] -2273.819 -1461.078 -1489.181
A1 A2 & A3 A4 A5
OF eu [e] 870.642 3178.062 -30.991 1917.450
OFag
′
[e] -239.444 -239.444 -0.262 0
OF dso
′
[e] -2869.32 -2938.618 -23.309 -30.217
Fig. 6: Traded energy (a) electricity price (b), and zkt (c)
between aggregator 2 and the DSO in C2 and C3 in the
monopolistic approach.
energy flexibility flow from end-users to aggregators, from
aggregators to the DSO, and from the DSO to the RTEM. In
C2 and C3, the total costs of the aggregators are positive.
In these scenarios, there are bidirectional energy transactions
between end-users and aggregators, aggregators and the DSO,
and the DSO and the RTEM as seen in Fig. 3(a). Also, end-
users do not wish to buy real-time energy from the DSO. Fig.
6 shows the energy traded between aggregator 2 and the DSO,
their corresponding electricity price, and z(k=2)t. As seen in
Fig.6(c), z(k=2)t is equal to 1 when PA2DSO(k=2)t is negative.
On the other hand, z(k=2)t equals 0 when PA2DSO(k=2)t ≥ 0. In
this way, optimal scenarios (instead of C1) for aggregators
and the DSO are C2 and C3, respectively. Thus, the DSO
allows end-users to manage their own energy flexibility in
a decentralized manner because this approach is profitable
for them in all scenarios. However, if aggregators are players
who are in charge of making laws for their corresponding
consumers, C2 and C3 are not profitable for aggregators.
In this way, aggregators do not allow end-users to manage
energy flexibility in a decentralized manner. Moreover, Table
III indicates that OF ag
′
equals zero, and there is no exchanged
energy between aggregators and the DSO in A5. Therefore, A5
cannot encourage aggregators as decision-makers in Problem
2. On the one hand, in A4, the total objective functions of all
agents are negative. In other words, A4 is profitable for all
agents. On the other hand, the power distribution network is
more sustainable and does not depend on the upstream grid in
A2 and A3 as shown in Fig. 3(b). However, the DSO bought
real-time energy from the RTEM in A5. Thus, A5 is the worst
scenario for the monopolistic approach from the perspective
of aggregators.
9Fig. 7: Real-time exchanged energy between the DSO and the
RTEM in A2 and A3 (a), in C1 and C3 (b) in game-based
approach.
TABLE IV: Total costs of end-users, aggregators, and the DSO
in the game-based approach.
OF eu [e] OFag
′
[e] OF dso
′
[e]
A1 157.767 -239.444 -3339.466
A2 1112.969 -143.909 -2413.909
A3 1826.025 -72.618 -1753.407
A4 2552.205 0 -1065.648
A5 2552.205 0 -1065.648
C1 159.767 -239.444 -8607.231
C2 1111.734 -100.082 -5612.034
C3 2552.205 0 -1065.648
C. Evaluation of Game-based Approach
In this section, the proposed energy flexibility management
problem is evaluated in terms of a game between end-users
and the DSO, and a game between aggregators and the DSO.
Thus, iterative game-based algorithms are defined for energy
flexibility transaction in the power distribution networks as
represented in Algorithms 1 and 2.
In Algorithm 1, it is defined that there is a game-based
interaction between the aggregators and the DSO. Here, A1-
A5 are considered to assess the performance of the energy
management system. As seen in Table IV, OF eu is positive
in all scenarios which means that game-based interaction
between aggregators and the DSO is not profitable for end-
users. Moreover, OF ag
′
equals zero in A4 and A5 because
there is no energy transaction from aggregators to the DSO
as shown in Fig. 4(a). Thus, A4 and A5 cannot motivate
aggregators to real-time energy flexibility trade with the DSO.
Instead of A1 which is an optimal scenario of the system
in which all end-users play as interruptible loads, the total
objective functions of all agents are lower in A2 in comparison
with A3. In other words, A2 is a more profitable scenario for
all agents in the power distribution system in comparison to
A3. However, the distribution network acts as the sustainable
energy system in A3, because end-users, aggregators and
the DSO make a closed loop for energy exchange in the
distribution network, and the DSO does not exchange energy
with the real-time electricity market as seen in Fig. 7(a).
On the other hand, Algorithm 2 defines a game-based energy
flexibility transaction between end-users and the DSO. Hence,
aggregators are not decision-makers for energy exchange in
Algorithm 2. The interaction between end-users and the DSO
is studied in three scenarios, C1-C3. As presented in Table IV,
C1 is an optimal scenario for all agents in this game. However,
TABLE V: Optimization statistics of the proposed energy
management model.
Execution Absolute/Relative No. No. No.
time [sec] gap Iter. Var. Eq.
C1 0.031 0 72 3,398 6,973
A1 0.033 0 1450 3,398 6,973
C3 is the worst scenario in which OF eu is maximum, and
the profit of the DSO is minimum. Also, OF ag
′
is equal to
zero. In addition, in C3, the energy transaction between the
DSO and the RTEM is one-way (from the RTEM to the DSO)
which is not sufficient for the power distribution network as
seen in Figs. 4(b) and 7(b). In addition, the MILP problem in
the game-based approach was solved by CPLEX 12.0 and the
implementation was performed on a laptop with 16 GB RAM,
Intel Core i7 2.9 GHz. The computation coss of scenarios C1
and A1 which are most profitable scenarios for all agents are
presented in Table V.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented monopolistic and game-
based approaches to manage energy flexibility among the agent
of the distribution network. The performance of the proposed
approaches to manage energy flexibility has been assessed in
terms of the impacts of the flexible behaviors of the end-
users and aggregators. According to the simulation results, it
is found that:
• The monopolistic approach is profitable for all agents in
the distribution network, if all end-users participate as
interruptible loads.
• Aggregators do not want to participate in DR programs
as their profits for the flexibility in energy exchange are
equal to zero.
• The game-based approach is costly for all end-users
because the DSO is in charge of determining the en-
ergy transacted between the DSO and end-users in our
proposed approach.
• In the game-based interaction between aggregators and
the DSO, the scenario considering the shiftable demand
constraint is more profitable than the scenario considering
the self-consumption limitation.
• The distribution network acts as a sustainable energy
system considering the sustainable demand constraint in
the game-based interaction among aggregators and the
DSO.
Finally, it should be mentioned that all agents have not been
considered as decision-makers in our proposed energy trading
strategies. In our future works, an interplay model is presented
based on direct interactions among end-users, aggregators and
the DSO. Furthermore, we will discuss how the distributed
energy management system could be modeled considering
peer-to-peer energy trade in distribution networks.
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